
# TCP flow control and connection setup



Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach

6<sup>th</sup> edition Jim Kurose, Keith Ross Addison-Wesley






## Chapter 3 outline

- 3.1 Transport-layer services
- 3.2 Multiplexing and demultiplexing
- 3.3 Connectionless transport: UDP
- 3.4 Principles of reliable data transfer


- 3.5 Connection-oriented transport: TCP
  - Segment structure
  - Reliable data transfer
  - Flow control
  - Connection management
- 3.6 Principles of congestion control
- 3.7 TCP congestion control


#### TCP flow control




#### TCP flow control

- Receiver advertises free buffer space by including rwnd value in TCP header
  - RcvBuffer size set via socket options (typical default is 4096 bytes)
  - Many operating systems autoadjust RcvBuffer
- Sender limits amount of unACKed in-flight data to receiver's rwnd value
- Guarantees receive buffer will not overflow





# TCP sliding window




### TCP sliding window

- Windows size = 0
  - Bytes up to an including ACK # 1 have been received
  - Receiver has not consumed data so don't send more
  - When ready, receiver issues same ACK # and non-zero window size
  - Provides the flow-control in TCP
- Sender can still send:
  - Urgent requests (e.g. kill the process)
  - Periodic window probe frames, see if window has opened
    - Prevents deadlock should the receiver's windows update get lost
    - Persistence timer

http://media.pearsoncmg.com/aw/aw\_kurose\_network\_4/applets/flow/FlowControl.htm http://www.ccs-labs.org/teaching/rn/animations/flow/index.htm

# Silly Window Syndrome



http://www.tcpipguide.com/free/t TCPSillyWindowSyndromeandChangesTotheSlidingWindow.htm

### Nagle's Algorithm


- Sender-side silly window avoidance
- Application produces data to send
  - If >= MSS, send segment
  - If no segments in flight, send the segment
  - Otherwise queue the data
- Limits to one small segment in network
  - But bad for interactive apps like gaming
  - Especially bad if combined with delayed ACKs
    - write byte, write byte, read byte
  - Can be disabled, TCP\_NODELAY option

#### Clark's solution

- Receiver-side silly window avoidance
- Do not send window size update unless:
  - It can handle full MSS size
  - Half of its buffer is empty

#### Limits in the TCP header

- Sequence number
  - 32 bits longs
- Receive window
  - 16 bits long
  - TCP has satisfied the requirement of the sliding window algorithm that the sequence number space be twice as big as the window size
  - $-2^{32} >> 2 \times 2^{16}$



## Protecting against wraparound

- Relevance of the 32-bit sequence number space
  - Sequence number may wraparound
  - A byte with sequence x could be sent, then later time a second byte with the same sequence x could be sent
  - Packets cannot survive in the Internet for longer than the maximum segment lifetime: MSL = 120s
  - Sequence number must not wrap around within MSL

Bandwidth	Time until Wraparound
T1 (1.5 Mbps)	6.4 hours
Ethernet (10 Mbps)	57 minutes
T3 (45 Mbps)	13 minutes
Fast Ethernet (100 Mbps)	6 minutes
OC-3 (155 Mbps)	4 minutes
OC-12 (622 Mbps)	55 seconds
OC-48 (2.5 Gbps)	14 seconds

# Keeping the pipe full

- 16-bit receive window must allow sender to keep the pipe full
- If the receiver has enough buffer space
  - Window can be opened to allow a full delay × bandwidth product's worth of data

Bandwidth	$Delay \times Bandwidth  Product$
T1 (1.5 Mbps)	18 KB
Ethernet (10 Mbps)	122 KB
T3 (45 Mbps)	549 KB
Fast Ethernet (100 Mbps)	1.2 MB
OC-3 (155 Mbps)	1.8 MB
OC-12 (622 Mbps)	7.4 MB
OC-48 (2.5 Gbps)	29.6 MB

#### TCP extensions

#### Timestamp option

- Timestamp added to segment by the sender
- Echoed by the receiver
- Sender can then compute RTT
- Also can be combined with sequence number
  - Protects against wraparound

#### Large window option

- Use a scale factor
- Left shift window size field by up to 14 bits
- Windows of up to 2<sup>30</sup> bytes


#### TCP extensions

- Selective acknowledgements (SACK)
  - Optional header fields used to acknowledge additional blocks
  - Sender can then resubmit only missing blocks
- Maximum Segment Size (MSS)
  - Only valid extension during connection setup
  - Set a non-default value for maximum segment size


## **Connection management**

#### Before exchanging data, sender/receiver handshake:

- Agree to establish connection
- Agree on connection parameters




Socket clientSocket =
 newSocket("hostname", port);




Socket connectionSocket =
 welcomeSocket.accept();

## Agreeing to establish a connection

#### 2-way handshake:







- Q: Will 2-way handshake always work in a network?
  - Variable delays
  - Retransmitted messages (e.g. req\_conn(x)) due to message loss
  - Message reordering
  - One side can't see other side


## Agreeing to establish a connection

#### 2-way handshake failure scenarios:






# TCP 3-way handshake




## TCP 3-way handshake: FSM




#### TCP: closing a connection

- Client, server each close their side of connection
  - Send TCP segment with FIN bit = 1
- Respond to received FIN with ACK
  - On receiving FIN, ACK can be combined with own FIN
- Simultaneous FIN exchanges can be handled




# TCP: closing a connection



# Connection: three-way handshake

Client	Server
	LISTEN, ACCEPT Passively waits for incoming connection
CONNECT Sends TCP segment to (IP, port) with SYN bit on, ACK bit off	
	Receives segment.  OS hands off to process that has done LISTEN on port.  If process accepts, send TCP with SYN and ACK bit set.




Server has to remember it's sequence number in step 2

# SYN flooding

#### SYN flooding

- Denial-of-service attack
  - Attacker sends large number of SYN requests
  - Never responds or spoofs source IP address
- Server runs out of resources
  - Server has to track assigned sequence number
  - Fills with half-open connections




#### SYN cookies

- Server generates sequence number
  - Uses cryptographic hash function
  - Combine counter, MSS requested, and secret generated from client/server IP and ports
  - Fires off response, forgetting number
  - Recover original sequence number if client responds

http://cr.yp.to/syncookies.html

http://nmap.org/nmap\_doc.html



#### nmap versus Tokyo

```
$ nmap -v -A 106.187.54.31 -p 1-65535
Scanned at 2012-10-16 16:31:38 MDT for 1391s
Not shown: 65526 closed ports
PORT
        STATE SERVICE VERSION
      open ssh
22/tcp
                           OpenSSH 5.9p1 Debian 5ubuntu1 (protocol 2.0)
ssh-hostkey: 1024 c5:ea:eb:88:a3:f1:d1:2d:5f:ed:63:c2:a8:54:bf:33 (DSA)
2048 d1:b3:75:95:ed:2a:13:90:27:89:1b:f4:f5:2b:b8:7c (RSA)
25/tcp filtered smtp
53/tcp filtered domain
67/tcp filtered dhcps
68/tcp filtered dhcpc
80/tcp open
                http Apache httpd 2.2.22 ((Ubuntu))
http-methods: No Allow or Public header in OPTIONS response (status code 200)
http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
1433/tcp filtered ms-sql-s
1434/tcp filtered ms-sql-m
8080/tcp open http-proxy Squid http proxy 3.1.19
http-methods: No Allow or Public header in OPTIONS response (status code 400)
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:kernel
Final times for host: srtt: 188947 rttvar: 3251 to: 201951
```

#### Summary

#### TCP flow control

- Each side informs other of available buffer space
- Other side never places more unACKed in-flight

#### TCP connection setup

- Three-way handshake
- Each size chooses random sequence number
- Can be exploited:
  - SYN flood attack
  - Port scanning (NMAP)